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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Denial of Benefits (hereinafter “DOB”) clauses are not 
a novelty in BITs. The NAFTA,1 CAFTA,2 and the ECT3 
(hereinafter “ECT”) all contain similar provisions. DOB’s 
were favored by States who wished to limit the benefits of the 
investment treaty to bona fide investors, in an effort to prevent 
treaty shopping. DOBs are “often seen as a safeguard against 
free riders,”4 or as a method “to preserve in the relationship 
between two states.”5 Because the existence of an 
international investment treaty regime is founded upon the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda,6 tribunals are dissuaded from 
reading a DOB clause in an investment treaty that does not 
                                                 
 
 
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1113.  
2 Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, art. 10.21.  
3 Energy Charter Treaty, art. 17.  
4 Loukas A. Mistelis & Crina Mihaela Baltag, Denial of Benefits and Article 
17 of the Energy Charter Treaty, 113(4) PENN STATE L. R. 1321 (2009).  
5 CRINA BALTAG, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: THE NOTION 
OF INVESTOR, Wolters Kluwer (2012); See also RUDOLF DOLZER & 
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW, 55 (Oxford University Press 2008) (“Under such a 
clause the states reserve the right to deny the benefits of the treaty to a 
company that does not have an economic connection to the state on whose 
nationality it relies. The economic connection would consist in control by 
nationals of the state of nationality or in substantial business activities in 
that state”).   
6 See generally Thomas Waelde, The “Umbrella” (or Sanctity of 
Contract/Pacta Sunt Servanda) Clause in Investment Arbitration, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, available at 
https://www.biicl.org/files/946_thomas_walde_presentation.pdf (last 
visited on Nov. 13, 2017).  
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expressly include it.7 Analytical approaches to the DOB 
clause as under Art. 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty has 
contributed to substantial jurisprudence in the development 
of the clause, its purpose, and use.  
Art. 17 of the ECT reads:  
 
Each Contracting Party reserves the right 
to deny the advantages of this Part to:   
1. a legal entity if citizens or nationals 
of a third state own or control such 
entity and if that entity has no 
substantial business activities in the 
Area of the Contracting Party in 
which it is organized; or   
2. an Investment, if the denying 
Contracting Party establishes that 
such Investment is an Investment of 
an Investor of a third state with or as 
to which the denying Contracting 
Party:   
a. does not maintain a diplomatic 
relationship; or   
b. adopts or maintains measures 
that:  
                                                 
 
 
7 See id; see also Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, 
Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 36 (Apr. 29, 2004) (“We regard the absence of 
[a denial-of-benefits] provision as a deliberate choice of the Contracting 
Parties. In our view, it is not for tribunals to impose limits on the scope of 
BITs not found in the text, much less limits nowhere evident from the 
negotiating history.”).  
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i. prohibit transactions 
with Investors of that 
state; or   
ii. would be violated or 
circumvented if the 
benefits of this Part 
were accorded to 
Investors of that state 
or to their Investments.  
  
There are two key features to the wording of this text 
that guide a reasonable interpretation should the clause be 
invoked by a State. On the one hand, the clause specifies that 
denying benefits of the treaty, is a right that is reserved to each 
contracting State. On the other hand, the clause provides that 
the denial of benefits may be to an investor or an investment. 
With regard to the former, interpretation of the exercise of the 
reserved right has been an issue of much contention under the 
ECT and under other treaties.8   
Other treaties, use similar wording in their DOB 
Clauses. The US-Ecuador BIT,9 CAFTA, and NAFTA 
“reserve” the right. This textual proposition poses many 
vexing question of procedure—what is the meaning of a 
“reserved” right? How should a State exercise a right that is 
reserved? Does it mean that the right does not exist until it is 
exercised? Tribunals have explored the extent and meaning 
                                                 
 
 
8 The most prominent and debated decision is of the ECT tribunal in Plama 
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005).  
9 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, 1993 [US-Ecuador BIT].  
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of the right itself, holding that a DOB clause must only be 
applied prospectively.10 This paper explores the question of 
whether the DOB clause should be applied retrospectively.11 
It consists of four parts including this introduction. Part II 
will appraise the reasoning used by tribunals so far, in 
determining the effects of the DOB clause. Part III will 
describe the three main arguments used by tribunals that 
categorically reject a retrospective application of a DOB 
clause. Part IV identify the flaws in the reasoning of the 
proposition by analyzing the right under the DOB clause. 
Part V will offer a conclusion by suggesting changes in the 
drafting of DOB clauses for an effective invocation and denial 
of benefits by a host state.  
 
II. TRIBUNALS IN FAVOR OF PROSPECTIVE 
APPLICATION  
It is interesting to note that no tribunal, under any investment 
treaty, has made a pronouncement of a “correct” time to 
                                                 
 
 
10 Supra note 8; see generally Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, 
SCC Case No. 080/2005, Final Award (Mar. 26, 2008) [ECT]; Empresa 
Electrica del Ecuador v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9, 
Award (June 2, 2009) [US-Ecuador BIT]; Ulysseas, Inc. v. Republic of 
Ecuador, UNCITRAL Interim Award (Sept. 28, 2011) [US-Ecuador BIT]; 
Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14 [ECT]; Petrobart Limited v. The 
Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003 [ECT]; Khan Resources Inc., 
Khan Resources B.V. and Cauc Holding Company Ltd. v. The 
Government of Mongolia and Monaton Co., Ltd. PCA Case No. 2011-09 
[ECT]. 
11 By questioning “retrospectivity” I mean, upon the “exercise” of the 
clause, does the denial of benefits occur from the time of the investment 
or from the time the clause is invoked?  
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invoke the DOB clause.12 The most prominent tribunal 
holding that a denial of benefits clause is to be applied 
prospectively, is the oft-criticized decision in Plama v. 
Bulgaria. 13 The tribunal in Plama held that a DOB clause 
could not have a retrospective effect because it is an issue 
related to the merits of the parties dispute;14 that only matters 
relating to procedure could have a prospective application, if 
any.  
Aside from the question of jurisdiction and 
admissibility of the question of denial of benefits,15 perhaps 
a less subjective ground is that of the concept of “half-notice.” 
For example, the tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine16 following the 
Plama decision held that the presence of a DOB clause in the 
                                                 
 
 
12 See generally Lindsay Gastrell & Paul-Jean Le Cannu, Procedural 
Requirements of ‘Denial-of-Benefits’ Clauses in Investment Treaties: A Review 
of Arbitral Decisions, 30(1) ICSID R. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 
JOURNAL,+7897+(2015)+available+at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siu030 (last visited on Nov. 13, 
2017).  
13 Supra note 8; see generally id.  
14 See generally the reasoning of the tribunal in Empresa Electrica del 
Ecuador v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9, Award (June 
2, 2009).  
15 See e.g. Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Global Reflections on 
International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution, ICC PUB. 601 
(2005). See also Michael Waibel, Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper 
No. 9/2014 (2014); Andrew Newcombe,  




16 Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, 
Final Award (Mar. 26, 2008).  
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BIT is only a “half notice” and that “without further 
reasonable notice of its exercise by the host state, its terms tell 
the investor little; and for all practical purposes, something 
more is needed.”17  
Treating the presence of the DOB clause in a BIT as a 
“half notice” is furthered more by what the Plama tribunal 
called an “active exercise.” In Khan Resources v. Mongolia,18 the 
tribunal first held that a question of denial of benefits does not 
deny a litigant the benefit of arbitration under the treaty. The 
Tribunal also held that the question of denial of benefits does 
not go to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, but goes to the 
admissibility instead.  
 
At the outset, it must be stated that in 
the Tribunal’s view, the Respondent’s 
argument cannot affect the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction over Khan Netherlands’ 
claims under the ECT. The 
introductory section of Article 17 of the 
ECT specifies that it concerns the denial 
of advantages of “this Part,” that is, 
Part III of the Treaty, which is titled 
“Investment Promotion and 
Protection” and sets forth the 
                                                 
 
 
17 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005) ¶ 157; See generally 
Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation (PCA 
Case No. AA 227), Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Nov. 
30, 2009).  
18 Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., and Cauc Holding Company 
Ltd. v. The Government of Mongolia, MonAtom LLC, UNCITRAL PCA 
Case No. 2011-09, Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 30, 2011). 
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substantive protections that each 
Contracting Party shall accord to 
investors of other contracting parties. 
Article 26 of the ECT, on which the 
Claimants rely to establish the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, is found in Part 
V, which is dedicated to “Dispute 
Settlement.” Thus, on a reading of the 
ordinary meaning of the terms of 
Article 17, this provision can operate to 
deny Khan Netherlands the benefit of 
the substantive protections it would 
otherwise be entitled to under the 
Treaty, but not to deny it the advantage 
of arbitrating its dispute with the 
Respondents before this Tribunal. The 
question of the application of Article 17 
is therefore one for the merits, not 
jurisdiction.19  
  
Therefore, the Khan Resources tribunal holds that an 
invocation of Art. 17(1) does not automatically deny benefits 
of the BIT to the party against whom the invocation is sought. 
Instead, the tribunal interpreted the DOB clause with the 
rules of interpretation from the Vienna Convention.20 By 
applying Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, the 
tribunal found that the ordinary meaning of the word 
“reserved” in the context of the DOB necessarily means that 
it is only a “half notice” through the following reasoning.  
                                                 
 
 
19 Id. at 88, ¶ 411.  
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.  
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Article 17(1) of the ECT provides that the Contracting 
Party “reserves the right” to deny the benefits of Part III of 
the ECT. The ordinary meaning of the verb “to reserve” 
suggests that the right to deny the benefits of the Treaty is 
being kept by the Contracting Party, to be exercised in the 
future.510 Had Article 17 been intended to deny benefits 
automatically, it could easily have been phrased to do so. A 
formulation such as: “The advantages of Part III of the ECT 
shall be denied to” would have made such meaning plain. 
This leads the Tribunal to conclude that the Contracting 
Party’s right to deny the benefits of Part III of the ECT must 
be exercised actively.21  
The reasoning from Khan Resources is in line with the 
jurisprudence on the ECT by past tribunals like Plama.22 And 
so the idea of half-notice directly influences the conclusion 
that the reserved right should be actively exercised.23 The 
tribunal in Liman Caspian Oil24 fully delineated the concept of 
an “active exercise” by holding:  
 
the Tribunal notes that there is no 
disagreement between the Parties on 
the point that Article 17 contains a 
                                                 
 
 
21 Supra note 18, at 90, ¶ 419.  
22 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005), ¶¶ 146-151.  
23 See generally Carmen Nunez-Lagos, The Invocation of “denial of benefits 
clauses”: when and how?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Feb. 17, 2014), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/02/17/theinvocatio
n-of-denial-of-benefits-clauses-when-and-how-2/ (last visited on Nov. 
12, 2017); see also supra note 12.  
24 Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14), Final Award.  
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notification requirement to the effect 
that a state must expressly invoke 
Article 17(1) of the ECT to rely on the 
rights under that provision. The 
Tribunal agrees that this is the only 
interpretation that can be drawn from 
the wording that the host state 
“reserves the right to deny the 
advantages of this Part”. To reserve a 
right, it has to be exercised in an explicit 
way.25  
  
This necessarily means that an active exercise is crucial 
for a contracting state to expect its interests to be protected 
under the BIT. The Liman Caspian tribunal further emphasizes 
that this active exercise requirement is a notification whose 
effects are only prospective.  
 
With regard to the question of whether 
the right under Article 17(1) of the ECT 
can only be exercised prospectively, the 
Tribunal considers that the above 
mentioned notification requirement – 
on which the Parties agree – can only 
lead to the conclusion that the 
notification has prospective but no 
retroactive effect.26  
  
                                                 
 
 
25 Id. ¶ 254.  
26 Id. ¶ 225.  
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The tribunal reasons that a prospective effect is was 
the intention of the parties to the BIT because the preamble to 
the BIT wishes to promote long term co-operation between the 
States; that such a long term cooperation is only possible if a 
clause that denies benefits can be exercised prospectively.  
 
Accepting the option of a retroactive 
notification would not be compatible 
with the object and purpose of the ECT, 
which the Tribunal has to take into 
account according to Article 31(1) of 
the VCLT, and which the ECT, in its 
Article 2, expressly identifies as “to 
promote long-term co-operation in the 
energy field”. Such long-term co-
operation requires, and it also follows 
from the principle of legal certainty, 
that an investor must be able to rely on 
the advantages under the ECT, as long 
as the host state has not explicitly 
invoked the right to deny such 
advantages. Therefore, the Tribunal 
finds that Article 17(1) of the ECT does 
not have retroactive effect.27  
  
                                                 
 
 
27 Id.  
222 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
III. THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSITION’S 
ARGUMENTS  
The tribunals so far have arrived at conclusion that an 
invocation of the DOB clause can only be prospective.28 First, 
since the presence of the clause in the BIT is only a “half-
notice”, it necessarily requires an active exercise in order for 
a State to prevent an investor from acquiring benefits under 
the BIT. This proposition has been delineated in the previous 
section of this paper.   
Second, that the interpretation of the clause in the 
context of the scheme of the ECT and its preamble necessarily 
renders the clause applicable only prospectively. This idea 
was explored by the Liman tribunal which ultimately led the 
tribunal to hold that the clause should only apply 
prospectively.29 The reason for this determination is two-
fold. Primarily, there is a difference in the balance of powers 
between an investor and a State.30 Secondarily, the tribunals 
                                                 
 
 
28 See generally Aldo A. Badini, Practical Lessons for States and Investors From 
the Pac Rim Arbitration, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION (Marianne Roth & Michael Geistlinger eds.) (2013).  
29 See supra note 24 at ¶¶ 224-25; See also Debora Pinto, Is the retrospective 
exercise of the ‘denial of benefits’ clause contrary to the investor’s legitimate 
expectations under the Energy Charter Treaty?, Maastrict University 
Working Paper (March 2016) DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1164.2481  (last 
visited on Nov. 13, 2017).  
30 See Arseni Matveev, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Evolving 
Balance Between Investor Protection and State Sovereignty, 348-86 40 UNIV. 
W. AUS. L. R. (2015). See also Henry Farrell, People are freaking out about the 
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so far have stressed that since the right under the DOB clause 
is reserved, it is necessary for its invocation to be “clear” and 
“public.”31 For instance, the Plama tribunal gives a list of 
instances as to how a DOB clause can be exercised in a 
manner that could possibly allow a retrospective application.  
 
The Tribunal has also considered 
whether the requirement for the right’s 
exercise is inconsistent with the ECT’s 
object and purpose. The exercise would 
necessarily be associated with publicity 
or other notice so as to become 
reasonably available to investors and 
their advisers. To this end, a general 
declaration in a Contracting State’s 
official gazette could suffice; or a 
statutory provision in a Contracting 
State’s investment or other laws; or 
even an exchange of letters with a 
particular investor or class of investors. 
Given that in practice an investor must 
distinguish between Contracting States 
with different state practices, it is not 
unreasonable or impractical to 
interpret Article 17(1) as requiring that 
a Contracting State must exercise its 
right before applying it to an investor 





31 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case no. 
ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005) at 50, ¶ 157  
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and be seen to have done so. By itself, 
Article 17(1) ECT is at best only half a 
notice; without further reasonable 
notice of its exercise by the host state, 
its terms tell the investor little; and for 
all practical purposes, something more 
is needed. 32  
  
Third, an investor’s legitimate expectations under the 
investment treaty may be violated if the denial of benefits 
clause is allowed to be exercised retrospectively. This is 
because, it is argued, that an investor will enjoy the benefits 
of the BIT until it has been put to an official notice by a clear 
expression by the host state. Otherwise, the investor could 
become entrenched into the host state without any return on 
its investment. This argument also goes back to the issue of 
balance of power.   
 
The covered investor enjoys the 
advantages of Part III unless the host 
state exercises its right under Article 
17(1) ECT; and a putative covered 
investor has legitimate expectations of 
such advantages until that right’s 
exercise. A putative investor therefore 
requires reasonable notice before 
making any investment in the host 
state whether or not that host state has 
exercised its right under Article 17(1) 
ECT. At that stage, the putative 
                                                 
 
 
32 Id.  
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investor can so plan its business affairs 
to come within or without the criteria 
there specified, as it chooses. It can also 
plan not to make any investment at all 
or to make it elsewhere. After an 
investment is made in the host state, 
the "hostage factor" is introduced; the 
covered investor’s choices are 
accordingly more limited; and the 
investor is correspondingly more 
vulnerable to the host state’s exercise of 
its right under Article 17(1) ECT. At 
this time, therefore, the covered 
investor needs at least the same 
protection as it enjoyed as a putative 
investor able to plan its investment. 
The ECT’s express "purpose" under 
Article 2 ECT is the establishment of "... 
a legal framework in order to promote 
long-term co-operation in the energy 
field ... in accordance with the 
objectives and principles of the 
Charter" (emphasis supplied). It is not 
easy to see how any retrospective effect 
is consistent with this "long-term" 
purpose.33  
  
                                                 
 
 
33 Id. at 51, ¶ 161.  
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This decision by the Plama tribunal has been cited by 
other tribunals as well, strengthening the overall influence of 
the argument over time.34  
 
IV. FLAWS WITH PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION  
The purpose of a DOB clause is to deter shell 
companies from obtaining the benefit of an investment 
treaty. It is a conscious decision that is made by contracting 
states to an investment treaty.35 The ability to enter into any 
clause of choice by contracting parties to an investment treaty 
is enshrined in the principle of pacta sunt servanda,36 and is a 
right that flows from the sovereignty of the state.37 The 
principles of pacta sunt servanda and state sovereignty 
necessarily coexist in the sphere of international investment 
law. This is precisely why a regular denial of benefits of an 
                                                 
 
 
34 See also Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 
080/2005, Final Award (Mar. 26, 2008) [ECT]; Empresa Electrica del 
Ecuador v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9, Award (June 
2, 2009) [USEcuador BIT]; Ulysseas, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL Interim Award (Sept. 28, 2010) [US-Ecuador BIT]; Liman 
Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14 [ECT]; Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz 
Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003 [ECT]; Khan Resources Inc., Khan 
Resources B.V. and Cauc Holding Company Ltd. v. The Government of 
Mongolia and Monaton Co., Ltd. PCA Case No. 2011-09 [ECT].  
35 See generally M Sornarajah, Good Faith, Corporate Nationality, and Denial of 
Benefits, in GOOD FAITH AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
(Andrew D Mitchell, M. Sornarajah, Tania Voon eds. 2015).  
36 Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign 
Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1550 (2008)  
37 M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT, at 88-143, 3d. (Cambridge University Press 2012).  
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investment treaty to an investor and its investment that is 
otherwise covered by the treaty, would violate the treaty.38  
However, when a treaty is drafted with the goal that it 
shall not entertain an investor or an investment that does not 
conform to the requirements of the investment treaty through 
a DOB clause, a tribunal must be conscious of the intent of 
the contracting parties. First, the DOB clause was included in 
treaties historically to safeguard contracting states against 
“free riders.”39 These “free riders” were nationals of a third 
state who cold reorganize their corporate structure in a 
manner that would allow them to gain rights or interests in a 
contracting state contrary to the intention of the contracting 
states to the treaty.40 Historically, the DOB clause was 
featured in the early treaties on Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (“FCN”) where the clause was referred to as a 
“reservation. . . directed primarily at the exercise by a 
company of its ‘functional’ rather than its ‘civil’ capacity.”41 
This would mean that a contracting state could deny the 
benefits of a treaty without automatically denying nationality 
or existence of the entity, or the ability of such entities to 
redressal in courts.42 But the ability of contracting states to 
determine the basis upon which it shall protect investors and 
                                                 
 
 
38 Id.  
39 Supra note 4, at 1302.  
40 Herman Walker Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial 
Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 373, 388 (1956).  
41 Id.  
42 Supra note 4, at 1303  
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investments goes to the central idea of state sovereignty 
itself.43  
For instance, academics note that a state can choose a 
“latent protective clause which [it] may utilize if it wishes to 
take the initiative of so doing”44 because it is the ‘basic task’ 
of a BIT to determine whether an investor has sufficient links 
to a treaty country. 45 The reason for this expedition is that 
granting benefits of investment treaties to third countries or 
to entities who “are primarily associated with those countries 
and with which the denying country has no relationship, 
would be ‘to abandon . . . [the] right to negotiate 
corresponding privileges and obligations from those 
countries.’46 ”47 Academics also note that a DOB clause and 
its presence in an international treaty is a “method to 
counteract nationality planning” that entities undertake 
when they attempt to invest in a country, purely to seek 
protection under an investment treaty.48 Therefore, the BIT 
will require that there exist a “bond” between the investor 
                                                 
 
 
43 See e.g. Ileana M. Porras, The Puzzling Relationship Between Trade and 
Environment: NAFTA, Competitiveness and the Pursuit of Environmental 
Welfare Objectives, 3 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 65 (1995).   
44 Supra note 40. 
45 Supra note 4, at 1303; See also J.W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact of Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries, 24 INT’L L. 655, 665 (1990) (stating that the 
determination of which investors are covered by the treay reveals the 
asymmetry in the relationship between the two countries.)  
46 Id.  
47 Supra note 4, at 1303.  
48 RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 55 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).  
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and the state whose nationality it claims to have, creating a 
DOB clause.   
 
Under such a clause the states reserve 
the right to deny the benefits of the 
treaty to a company that does not have 
an economic connection to the state on 
whose nationality it relies. The 
economic connection would consist in 
control by nationals of the state of 
nationality or in substantial business 
activities in that state.49  
 
This goal is even evidenced in the early FCN’s50 which 
was modified to be introduced into modern day BITs. For 
example, the following is the text from an FCN between the 
U.S. and China:  
 
each High Contracting Party reserves 
the right to deny any of the rights and 
                                                 
 
 
49 Id.  
50 The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, with Final Protocol 
between the United States of America and Siam, signed on 13 November 1937, 
provides in Article 1(8) that “neither High Contracting Party shall be 
required by anything in this paragraph to grant any application for any 
such right or privilege [exploration and exploitation of mineral resources] 
if at any time such application is presented the grating of all similar 
applications shall have been suspended or discontinued.”; See also 
Thailand—U.S. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, signed on 29 May 
1966, in 5 INT’L LEG. MATERIALS 876, 884 art. XII(1)(f) (1966), Treaty of 
Amity and Economic Relations between the United States of America and the 
Togolese Republic, signed on 8 February 1966.  
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privileges accorded by this Treaty to 
any corporation or association created 
or organized under the laws and 
regulations of the other High 
Contracting Party which is directly or 
indirectly owned or controlled, 
through majority stock ownership or 
otherwise, by nationals, corporations 
or associations of any third country or 
countries.51 
  
This stresses the purpose of DOB’s clause is a 
determination by each contracting state to decide whether 
treaty benefits should be granted to a national suspected of 
indulging in ‘treaty shopping.’52 Soon after their presence in 
FCNs, the DOB clause trickled down into model BIT’s as 
well.53 Therefore, the object and purpose of a DOB clause is 
                                                 
 
 
51 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of 
America and the Republic of China, signed on 4 November 1946 and entered 
into force on 30 November 1948, in 43 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 27, 48 art. 
XXVI (5) (1949). 
52 P.B. Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 21 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 373, 379-80 (1985); For treaty shopping, see generally M. 
Sornarajah, Portfolio Investments and the Definition of Investment 24 ICSID 
REV. 516 (2009); M. Sornarajah, Evolution or revolution in international 
investment arbitration? The descent into normlessness, in Evolution in 
International Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Brown Chester and 
Miles Kate eds. 2011); See also JORUN BAUMGARTNER, TREATY 
SHOPPING IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 
53 See e.g. 1994 U.S. Model BIT, in CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, 
LAURENCE SHORE, & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL 
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to prevent a treaty shopping investor from acquiring benefits 
of the BIT because the contracting parties to the treaty 
specifically intended such an effect.  
Another important factor that tribunals have 
overlooked in their logic to favor a prospective application is 
the concept of the notice. Tribunals derive the conclusion that 
the presence of the DOB clause in the BIT is a half notice, from 
the text of the clause itself. For instance, the ECT states: “Each 
Party reserves the right to deny benefits . . .” Supposedly, the 
word reserves is a latent right.54 But such an interpretation is 
still contrary to the object and purpose of the DOB clause 
itself. In its justification, the Plama tribunal distinguished 
between the existence of a right and the actual exercise of the 
right.  
 
a Contracting Party has a right under 
Article 17(1) ECT to deny a covered 
investor the advantages under Part III; 
                                                 
 
 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 386-92 
app. 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007). (The text read:  
Each Party reserves the right to deny to a company of the 
other Party the benefits of this  
Treaty if nationals of a third country own or control the 
company and   
a) the denying Party does not maintain normal 
economic relations with the third country; or  
b) the company has no substantial business activities 
in the territory of the Party under whose laws it is 
constituted or organized.) 
54 See supra note 34, where all the decisions specifically state that a 
reserved right is so dormant that it requires an active exercise in a manner 
that is clear to the investor against whom it is invoked.  
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but it is not required to exercise that 
right; and it may never do so.55  
 
Therefore, academics and tribunals alike, are in 
agreement that the DOB clause under the ECT, is silent on the 
method of invoking the right under the clause.56 But this is 
not necessarily tru. If in actuality, there is ambiguity in the 
construction of the clause as to its exercise, the interpretation 
can still be achieved through the application of the Vienna 
Convention.57 However, tribunals have incorrectly applied 
the Vienna Convention by making the central focus of the 
clause the investor.  
  
For the Investor, the practical 
difference between prospective and 
retrospective effect is sharp. The 
former accords with the good faith 
interpretation of the relevant wording 
of Article 17(1) in the light of the ECT’s 
object and purpose, but the latter does 
not.58  
  
The tribunal concluded that a prospective application 
was appropriate also because a retrospective application 
                                                 
 
 
55 Supra note 8, ¶ 155.  
56 Supra note 4, at 1319; see also id at ¶¶ 157-58. Cf  H. Essig, Balancing 
Investors; Interests and State Sovereignty: The ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction 
Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 5 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.  
INTELLIGENCE,  (April 2007) (recommending that States should enact a 
law that is clear as to the exercise of the DOB clause)  
57 Supra note 20.  
58 Supra note 8, ¶ 164.  
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would contradict the objects and purpose of the ECT by 
discouraging investments since it violates the “legitimate 
expectations” of an investor.59 However, legitimate 
expectations are determined by the information the investor 
knew at the time of investment planning.60 Other tribunals 
have held time and time again that legitimate expectations of 
an investor are “based on the conditions offered by the host 
state at the time of the investment.”61 Therefore, it is 
necessary for the basic expectations to exist at the time of the 
investment in order for an investor to claim that protection 
itself is part of the legitimate expectations by itself.61  
                                                 
 
 
59 See also Michele Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: 
Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a controversial concept, 28 ICSID 
REV. (2013).  
60 See Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, At What Time Must 
Legitimate Expectations Exist? TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. in A 
LIBER AMICORUM: THOMAS WALDE – A LAW BEYOND 
CONVENTIONAL THOUGHT (2012) 61 See Tecnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, Award, 29 May 2003, 43 I.L.M. 
133, ¶ 130 (2004).  
61 See Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets. L.P. v. Argentine 
Republic, Award 22 May 2007 (concerning Enron’s indirect investment of 
35.5% in Transporatadora Gas del Sur, one of the major Argentine 
networks for the transportation and distribution of fas, Argentina had 
offered by means of the Argentine Gas Law, the Gas Decree and the Basic 
Rules of the License key tariff-related guarantees); See also B.G. Group Plc 
v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, 24 December 2007 (where B.G. 
Group had a direct and indirect investment in MetroGas, a natural gas 
distribution company incorporated in Argentina); See also LG&E Energy 
Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine 
Republic, Decision on Liability, 21 ICSID REV. 2013 (2006); See also  
National Grid v. Republic of Argentina, Award, 3 November 2008; See 
supra, note 60, at 3.  
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Surely, the concept of legitimate expectations is 
subject to the kind of investment that is made as well. 
Tribunals have stressed on the totality of an investment in 
determining the kind of expectations an investor might have 
had while making its investment plan and structure in the 
host state.62 But the focal point to determine legitimate 
expectation is the exact point in time when the decision to 
invest was taken.63 Several items may be classified as the 
information available to an investor at the time it makes the 
investment, including any particular assurances made to an 
investor by the host state, specific contractual arrangements, 
particular promises exchanged between the host state and the 
investor, and the protections extended under the investment 
treaty.64 The protections guaranteed under an investment 
treaty are a general expectation. 65 Therefore, when an 
investor reads the text of the investment treaty under which 
it seeks coverage and finds a DOB clause therein, the 
legitimate expectation of the investor cannot be said to exist 
without qualification. From an investment law perspective, 
an investor has already been put on notice of a clause that 
could potentially be invoked by the host state to protect its 
interests.66 Since there the key factor in the determination of 
                                                 
 
 
62 See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, a.s (“CSOB”). v. The Slovak 
Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4). 
63 Supra note 60, at 8; See also Sempra Energy International v. Argentine 
Republic, Award, 28 September 2007; LG&E   
64 See generally supra note 60.  
65 Id.  
66 See Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil SA. V. Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, 18 August 2008 (the 
tribunal took into consideration, the expectations that Duke Energy had 
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legitimate expectations, is the appreciation of cumulative 
facts and circumstances that surround the investor, a blanket 
statement as to the application of a DOB clause is therefore 
untenable.67 James Chalker correctly described the tendency 
of the tribunal in Plama:  
 
Plama constructed a legal standard 
overly deferential to the investor and 
interpreted the ECT's object and 
purpose with an overemphasis on 
investor protection to dismiss 
Bulgaria's jurisdictional objection. The 
tribunal equated the object and 
purpose of the ECT with a high degree 
of investor protection. This protection 
is not limited to basic issues of fairness 
or nondiscrimination, but includes 
predictability, namely the ability to rely 
on Article 26 of the ECT to litigate a 
claim. The tribunal cited two sources 
for its interpretation of the ECT's object 
and purpose: Article 2 of the Treaty and 
an essay by "distinguished 
commentators", but it also suggested 
                                                 
 
 
at the time of the investment, and at a later time, based on the facts that 
had occurred in the period prior to the investment made in Ecuador).  
67 See also James Chalker, Making the Energy Charter Treaty Too Investor 
Friendly: Plama Consortium Limited v. The Republic of Bulgaria, 5 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2005) available at www.transnational-
disputemanagement.com/article.asp?key=874; See generally 
IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
(Armand de Mestral & Celine Levesque eds., 2013).  
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that concern for investor protection 
permeates the ECT. While the ECT is 
certainly concerned with investment 
promotion, the Plama tribunal 
misinterpreted International Court of 
Justice and international arbitral 
tribunal decisions and overstated the 
amount of investor protection 
demanded by the Treaty's object and 
purpose, and in so doing, failed to 
engage in a meaningful inquiry into its 
basis for jurisdiction.68  
  
It is with these flaws in mind that one must evaluate 
the decision of the tribunal in Plama that has been faithfully 
reproduced in other decisions of tribunals under the ECT. But 
following a wrong consistently does not change the fact that 
the core principle and argument is wrong. A tribunal looking 
to make any sense of the DOB clause under the ECT must 
therefore pay close attention to several aspects of the 
investor, and of its investment before it attempts to interpret 
a portion of the ECT.  
First, the tribunal must determine the point at which 
the investor can be said to have possessed legitimate 
expectations of protection under the ECT. This means, the 
tribunal must necessarily take into account whether the host 
state has made particular promises, or entered into specific 
covenants with that specific investor to induce an 
investment. Second, the tribunal must then explore whether 
the investor has indulged in legitimate treaty shopping. This 
                                                 
 
 
68 Id.  
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does not mean to imply that treaty shopping is inherently 
bad or detrimental to the interests of the host state. Treaty 
shopping is good due diligence employed by an investor in 
order to make legitimate investments that can be beneficial 
to the host state.69 Third, in inquiring whether the application 
of the DOB should be prospective or retrospective, the 
tribunal must necessarily rely upon the specific point in time 
where the investor assumed legitimate expectations of 
protection under the investment treaty. This point will guide 
the tribunal to align itself with the intent of the contracting 
parties to the BIT in the inclusion of the DOB clause.70 Finally, 
a tribunal must also ask whether the investor or the 
investment that is being denied protection under the treaty is 
the kind that the contracting parties intended to be covered 
under the DOB clause. This means that the tribunal must 
necessarily perform an analysis of the requirements under a 
DOB before it determines whether the state can effectively 
deny benefits.  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
In light of the aforementioned fallacies in the logic 
consistently used by tribunals to delegitimize a host state’s 
prerogative in denying benefits of a BIT to an investor or an 
                                                 
 
 
69 See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 52.  
70 The intent of the contracting parties to an international treaty is also part 
of the travaux préparatoires of the treaty itself and must be given due 
consideration in the interpretation of a treaty. See RICHARD GARDINER, 
TREATY INTERPRETATION (Oxford, 2d. 2015); See also MARC J. 
BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). 
238 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
investment, it may be necessary to re-structure the clause 
itself. This is recommended especially in the light of the 
misinterpretation of tribunals that wish to cite to the decision 
in Plama to gain the ability to prevent a host state from 
denying benefits.  
Before proposing a re-drafted DOB clause, it is also 
necessary to talk about the definition of an “investor” under 
a BIT. The definition clauses of a treaty are the most 
important tool used by a tribunal to decipher what 
contracting parties to the treaty intended by their use of 
common place words. These words include “asset,” 
“finance” etc. If contracting parties to an investment treaty 
wish to truly prevent treaty shopping in their jurisdictions 
and effectively reduce the chances that an investor can 
misuse the investment treaty, contracting parties must 
necessarily re-think their strategy with the definitions clause. 
Arguably, for the most part, the people who draft an 
investment treaty are seldom lawyers, but are diplomats and 
politicians who may not be fully aware of the legal 
consequences of difference in terminology. Furthermore, 
there is paucity of uniform legal language across the world. 
What may be a simple, un-complicated word in a civil law 
context, may be totally different from the legal context and 
the interpretation of the word in a common law context. 
Therefore, the lack of a uniform consensus on the usage of 
terms may pose to be quite a challenge.  
Investment treaties have, in the past changed the way 
in which an investor is viewed. Some have a nationality test 
for the determination of who a recognized investor under the 
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treaty is, some others have a control test.71 These tests are also 
a means for states to determine which kind of investors it 
wishes to recognize.72 Therefore, the definition of an investor 
must be aligned with the requirements of a DOB clause for 
better execution by a host state. By aligning both definitions, 
two purposes are achieved. First, there is no ambiguity 
regarding which investor may be denied benefits because the 
test is in-tune with the rest of investment treaty. Second, an 
investor is put on notice of its ineligibility to acquire treaty 
protections altogether because the investor would not 
otherwise be covered under the treaty anyway.  
Therefore, the following is the proposed revision of a 
DOB clause in manner that circumvents the issue of 
invocation giving notice to a putative investor and that of the 
defense of legitimate expectations.  
 
Art. X: Each Contracting Party hereby denies 
benefits of the entirety of this investment treaty to:  
1. a legal entity  
a. if citizens or nationals of a third 
state own or control such entity; 
and   
b. if that entity has no substantial 
business activities in the Area of 
                                                 
 
 
71 For more on the types of tests and the influence of the ICSID 
Convention, see Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Kingdom 
of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (French 
Original: 129 Journal du droit international 196 (2002)) (English 
translation: 42 I.L.M 609 (2003), 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004)).  
72 See also Alex Grabowski, The Definition of Investment under the ICSID 
Convention: A Defense of Salini, 15(1) CHI. J. INT’L L. (2014)  
240 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
the Contracting Party in which it 
is organized; or   
2. an Investment, if the denying 
Contracting Party establishes that 
such Investment is an Investment 
of an Investor of a state that is not 
a Contracting Party to this treaty, 
or as to which the denying 
Contracting Party:   
a. does not maintain a diplomatic 
relationship; or   
b. adopts or maintains measures that:  
i. prohibit transactions 
with Investors of that 
state; or   
ii. would be violated or 
circumvented if the 
benefits of this Part 
were accorded to 
Investors of that state 
or to their Investments.  
3. For the purposes of clause 1 above, 
ownership shall mean [ownership 
by percentage of shares or stake 
owned in the entity or otherwise in 
sync with the definition of an 
“investor” under the investment 
treaty; and control shall mean 
[type of control exercised by the 
parent company over the 
subsidiary that is the investor, or 
by the board of directors who are 
nationals of a third state]  
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This definition now clarifies that the right under a 
DOB clause is no longer “reserved” and is more automatic 
from the outset of the treaty, dismissing any insinuation that 
the benefits of the treaty could possibly extend to any 
“investor.” And finally, the third clause clarifies the 
threshold that tribunals must now follow to determine what 
kind of investors will not be protected under the treaty. The 
second part of the definition also takes inspiration from the 
many cases on piercing the corporate veil to enable tribunals 
to see that the intent of the contracting states was to dissuade 
treaty shopping and prevent shell companies from gaining 
coverage under the treaty.73  
                                                 
 
 
73 For piercing of the corporate veil in general, see generally Yaraslau 
Kryvoi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in International Arbitration, 1 GLOB. BUS. 
L. REV. 169-186 (2011); See also Yaraslau Kryvoi, Piercing the Corporate Veil 
and Enforcement, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (May  3,+2010), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2010/05/03/piercing-the-
corporate-veil-and-enforcement/. 
